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COMMENTS ON THE GRISWOLD CASE 
THE GRISWOLD PENUMBRA: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHARTER FOR AN EXPANDED LAW 
OF.PRIVACY? 
Robert G. Dixon, Jr.* 
W HEN an "uncommonly silly law"
1 produces the "most signif-
icant decision"2 of the Supreme Court term, and the seven-
man majority has to be held together with four opinions, some in-
quiry is in order. Either there is some hyperbole in the terms "silly" 
and "significant," or we are witnessing the birth of a new facet of con-
stitutional meaning as an offshoot'of a rather special case concerning 
Connecticut's attempted prohibition of birth control clinics through 
the utilization of its statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 
Griswold v. Connecticut8 contains the clearest articulation to date 
(although it is none too clear at that) of the constitutional founda-
tions of a yearning for "privacy," which constitutes a major com-
ponent of "the American dream." More subjective even than 
"liberty" and "justice," the "privacy" idea ovei:laps both,: and even 
turns back on itself to create internal contradictions. For example, 
privacy is an activist concept supporting freedom of expression in 
the associational privacy cases. But it is a passivist concept-the right 
to be let alone-in the school prayer and Bible-reading area, where 
it has been argued, without explicit judicial recognition as yet,4 
that even an excusal system does not save the regulation, because the 
necessary requirement of self-identification (in order to obtain per-
mission to absent oneself) itself constitutes an invasion of privacy. 
Nevertheless, there is a common feature of the two concepts-an 
interest in nondisclosure of one's identity. 
If what follows is as long on privacy in general as on Griswold, it 
is because the case is longer on yearning than on substantive content. 
• Professor of Law, George Washington University.-Ed. 
I. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
2. Keeffe, Practicing Lawyers' Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 51 A.B.A.J. 
885 (1965). 
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
4. Sec School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 319 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
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The editors' invitation to discuss the case has prompted a rethinking 
of a temporarily postponed project on a synthesis on privacy-a task 
easier to outline than to execute. 
All that Griswold actually decided was that a statutory system 
which operated to make it a crime for married couples to use con-
traceptives (although there was not even a hint of direct en-
forcement), and for clinics to conduct examinations and prescribe 
contraceptives (which was the actual enforcement issue), was uncon-
stitutional. The substantive statute merely prohibited contraceptive 
use; a general aiding and abetting statute furnished the grounds for 
suppression of the clinic. In order to reach (or create) a privacy issue, 
the Court allowed the sole defendants-Mrs. Griswold, the clinic 
director, and Dr. Buxton, the clinic medical director-to assert the 
rights of married clients of the clinic. The case was discussed judi-
cially, therefore, as though the key issue was state scrutiny of the 
marital couch; questions concerning the validity of regulations on 
the manufacture, distribution, and sale of contraceptives, and con-
cerning the validity of the regulation of birth control clinics absent 
an anti-contraceptive use statute were left unresolved. 
To reach the conclusion that the Connecticut laws were uncon-
stitutional, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, 
first took a broad view of "standing" to assert the rights of third 
parties, and then, on the merits, ranged broadly through the Bill 
of Rights, talking loosely about "zones of privacy"5 directly or 
peripherally protected by the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth 
amendments. In even broader fashion, Mr. Justice Goldberg took 
great pains to revive the "forgotten" ninth amendment,6 so that it 
emerges especially suited to support whatever "other rights" can be 
articulated. 
The comments that follow are divided into a brief review, for 
purposes of perspective, of the elusive nature of "privacy" as devel-
oped in American law to date, and an attempted rigorous analysis 
of the privacy aspects of Griswold. A final section suggests that 
effectuation of the new constitutional right of marital privacy neces-
sarily or derivatively implies a corollary right of access to birth 
control information and devices-a right which should have been 
more clearly articulated by the Court. 
5. 381 U.S. at 484. 
6. Id. at 490 n.6, referring to PATIERSON, THE FoRGOITEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955). 
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l. PROLEGOMENON ON PRIVACY 
One of the warmest words in the literature of political and legal 
philosophy is "privacy." Characterized as the "right to be let alone"7 
in Mr. Justice Brandeis' oft-quoted statement, it has been accorded 
first rank as the most valued right of civilized men. Few concepts, 
however, are more vague or less amenable to definition and struc-
tured treatment than privacy. Under this emotional term march a 
whole congeries of interests, some closely interrelated, some almost 
wholly unrelated and everi inconsistent. Two broad, variant strands 
are the "public law" meaning of privacy and the "private law" mean-
ing of privacy, but even within these two broad categories quite 
different species of claims and conflict arise, and loose terminology 
abounds. 
A. "Privacy" in Private Law 
In the robust tradition of the common law, as was so well sum-
marized in the seminal essay by Warren and Brandeis on the private-
law meaning of privacy, 8 little redress was available for the more 
refined forms of intrusion by one private person on the solitude and 
psychic integrity of another. Unless the invasion amounted to a tres-
pass or a nuisance, or could be characterized as a breach of confidence 
or of implied contract, or affected something like a letter in which 
· the aggrieved party could assert a property interest of sorts, relief 
was not forthcoming. The major contribution of Warren and 
Brandeis was in showing through rigorous critical analysis that 
doctrines of trespass, nuisance, and property were inadequate for 
the occasion, and that a new co:q.cept of protectible privacy could 
and should be evolved, both as a basis for an intelligible rationale 
for the handful of existing cases and for future development. 
In the process of evolution, what seemed like a single concept has 
been refined into a loose conglomeration of four torts which, as Dean 
Prosser has noted, 9 have little in common other than interference 
with a person's "right to be let alone." The four torts are (I) intru-
sion on physical solitude or seclusion; (2) publication of unpleasant, 
although non-defamatory, information about a person; (3) placing 
of a person in a false but not necessarily defamatory position in the 
public eye (for example, by attributing to him views that he does 
7. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
8. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAR.v. L. REv. 193 (1890). 
9. PRossER, ToRTS 832 (3d ed. 1964) •. 
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not hold); (4) unauthorized commercial use of a person's name or 
picture. From a functional standpoint it appears that two quite 
different interests are being protected: freedom from physical in-
trusion on solitude, and freedom from unwanted communication 
aborit oneself. Use of the term "right of privacy" as an index heading 
is confined almost exclusively to these private torts, in addition to 
some governmental search and seizure matters, wiretapping-eaves-
dropping, and self-incrimination. 
Dean Prosser has appropriately observed that the courts have 
been so preoccupied with the question whether the tort exists at 
all that there has been little discussion of its juristic nature and 
limitations. However, his own suggestion of substituting a generic 
tort-intentional infliction of mental suffering-hardly seems ade-
quate, because in few of the privacy cases is there "pure" malice. 
The presence of other interests, which explains such limiting doc-
trines as the press privilege of dissemination of "newsworthy" 
information, indicates that a balancing process must be going on, 
although it is not always clearly articulated what is being balanced, 
particularly on behalf of the injured party. An "intentional inflic-
tion" doctrine could render the right of privacy in tort law overly 
narrow, in the process of making it more absolute. For thi~ reason 
there is much appeal in a recent attempt to keep attention focused 
on privacy as an aspect of human dignity, or, indeed, as a "spiritual 
interest"10 rather than merely as an interest in property and reputa-
tion. Although such an approach may not make cases any easier to 
solve, it may help to keep attention focused on those elements of 
privacy which make it uniquely valued among laymen, who, after 
all, are the customers of the law. 
B. "Privacy" in Public Law 
In regard to the relations between a government and its citizens, 
the use of the term "right of privacy" suggests issues and values quite 
different from those encountered in private law. The term nowhere 
appears in the Constitution, but is quite obviously a background 
interest underlying the specific guarantees of the third, fourth, and 
fifth amendments in regard to quartering of troops, search and 
seizure, and self-incrimination. Important as the last two categories 
IO. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964), 
Professor Bloustein's article was prepared under the auspices of the Special Committee 
on Science and Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, as part 
of its study examining the impact of modern technology upon privacy. 
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are, they represent well-established categories already subjected to 
extensive discussion. Furthermore, although they overlap to a degree 
the private tort of intrusion upon solitude, neither has been deemed 
germane to at least two of the several major, recurring "privacy" 
problems of our time-wiretapping and eavesdropping,11 and free-
wheeling legislative investigations of persons unable or unwilling to 
plead self-incrimination.12 
If the fourth and fifth amendments are deemed to exhaust the 
field of constitutional protection of privacy, then it is a rather 
narrow field and one unbefitting the concept of privacy as the pre-
eminent right of civilized men. However, there are a number of 
additional outreaches of privacy in American public law, albeit of 
uncertain dimension, as manifestations of the continuing devel-
opment of the first amendment and of the concept of due process. 
Examples include the various privacies associated with the field of 
religion and belief,13 privacy in politics, including the secret ballot14 
and nondisclosure of political or social beliefs and associations,15 the 
scope of employee duties of candor and disclosure,16 the use of non-
Communist oaths and oaths in general,17 statutory protection of the 
solitude of householders by restrictions on canvassing,18 freedom of 
associational choice, including self-segregation, in "private" housing, 
education, and other fields.19 
Of course, apart from the question of specific constitutional pro-
tection of privacy, the American concept. of limited government 
11. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952): Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438 (1928); cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
12. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 
U.S. 431 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); cf. Deutch v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961). , 
13. It is questionable whether privacy is furthered by West Virginia State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which granted a broad exemption from a flag 
salute requirement in the interest of a general freedom of speech and belief, but al-
lowed the flag salute requirement to continue. See Dixon, Religion, Schools, and the 
open Society: A Socio-Constitutional Issue, 13 J. Pun. L. 267, 281-88 (1965). 
14. Nutting, Freedom of Silence-Constitutional Protection Against Governmental 
Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 M1cH. L. REv. 181 (1948). . 
15. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
16. Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 
468 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
17. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 
U.S. 278 (1961);· Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183 (1952). 
18. Breard, v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
19. Avins, The Right Not To Listen, 51 A.B.A.J. 656 (1965); Avins, Freedom of 
Choice in Personal Service Occupations-Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on Anti-
discrimination Legislation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 228 (1964); Avins, Prima Facie Tort and 
Injunction-New Remedies Against Sitdowns, 24 GA. B.J. 20 (1961). 
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formerly helped to maximize privacy by affording a protection of 
sorts to economic, social, and racial laissez-faire. This domain of 
privacy inherent in a system of limited government has now been 
considerably eroded by the freeing of federal legislative power 
through broad construction of the commerce and expenditure 
clauses, and by the demise of substantive due process as a check on 
economic and social legislation.20 Both the purpose and the effect of 
the new legislative norms and extensive administrative regulation 
are to diminish the area of "free" contract, a supposed freedom 
resting at times on imbalances in knowledge and bargaining power 
between investor and dealer, worker and employer, and supplier 
and manufacturer. But the impact of much of the regulation may 
not be so much to diminish the right to be let alone as to diminish 
a power to act as one pleases without regard to external impacts, 
which is not quite the same thing. 
C. The Idea of Privacy 
A lengthy essay could be written on the historical evolution of 
privacy concepts21 from the early Greek "politics of participation," 
in which personal virtue was equated with civic virtue and privacy 
had no place, to the robust individualism of the American frontier, 
where the mores of society forbade inquiry into a man's past. Suffice 
it to say that the exploration would entail inquiry into the Judea-
Christian concept of the "soul," that recessive, untouchable essence 
of man, the Germanic concept of the "folk," in which the individual 
found pis true identity and expression, and the Reformation theory 
of direct and personal relation to God. In a study of the modem 
era, particular stress would have to be placed on the natural-rights 
movement, which postulates the intrinsic value of pre-social personal 
status and absolute birthrights; on the abstrusities of Rousseau, 
where the absorption of the individual will into the socialized 
"general will" implies total abnegation of privacy; and on the recent 
pragmatic evolution of democratic socialism and the security state, 
in which the forces of organization threaten to crowd out privacy 
and, indeed, all of the passive virtues.22 
20. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 
84. 
21. See generally SABINE, A HISTORY OF PoLmCAL THEORY (rev. ed. 1950). 
22. The growing corporate and government practice of psychiatric evaluation and 
psychological testing of employees poses interesting questions about the range and 
depth of probing, about the limits of required disclosure to employers, and about 
means of safeguarding against arbitrariness in the use of such data by employers. 
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The extent to which one finds privacy interests and threatened 
invasions of privacy interests depends largely on how the term is 
defined, or, if definition is impossible, how the term is conceived. 
Many commentators23 have begun with the broad and warm Bran-
deisian invocation of a "right to be let alone." But only a hermit 
living outside society has such a right; unqualified, the "right" flies 
in the face of all social control. For what purpose is a person let 
alone? Are social purposes served by the right so that, in according 
recognition to the right, society is actually serving its long-term 
interest while restraining its immediate impulse to assert control? 
Does society, by recognizing the right, preserve and encourage per-
sonal well-springs of creativity and differentiation-needed by 
society if it is to avoid stagnation-which would be stifled by com-
pelled conformity to majoritarian values and practices? Or is a "so-
cial" justification of privacy a self-defeating thing, undercutting the 
essence of the privacy interest? Is being let alone an end in itself 
as part of the dignity of man, akin to a natural right, needing no 
utilitarian justification in terms of social product? In short, is 
privacy intrinsic or derivative? 
Obviously, radically different approaches originate in these dif-
ferent premises. Even though it be granted that a balancing of com-
peting claims, values, and "goods" is always present as part of the 
never-ending process of reasoned choice, it still may make a world 
of difference whether one postulates social control and demands that 
privacy prove its social utility, or postulates privacy and counsels 
official restraint even where the privacy "good" is uncertain and the 
official action is aimed toward a "good" end. The latter approach is 
not quite the same thing as the "preferred position" approach in 
regard to freedom of expression, because in evaluating freedoms of 
expression we are weighing an identifiable, outward-looking course 
of conduct against competing social standards and interests. Speech, 
publication, and parades involve overt measurable conduct rather 
than privacy. It is only when we tum to a freedom of non-expression 
or inaction that privacy as a distinctive concept enters the calculus. 
Freedoms of expression can exist without enjoying a "preferred" 
position, although their exact content may be affected. But to deny 
to privacy the character of a self-justifying end is, perforce, to social-
ize it; and to socialize it is to foredoom it to unequal competition 
with easily perceived, immediate, and pressing needs of society.24 
23. E.g., Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960). 
24. "Once privacy is invaded, privacy is gone." Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 
U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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The free-speech claimant asserts deviant views and values; the privacy 
claimant doesn't want to play ball at all. The former is still part 
of the open society and fights his battle in the marketplace of ideas; 
the latter is part of the closed society and fights to withhold his 
allegiance and perhaps even his identity and associations. 
The premise of intrinsic privacy as an end in itself is clearly 
perceived in the fourth amendment, where we start with the nearly 
absolute premise that a man's home is his castle, and the fifth amend-
ment, where we accord silence', and secrecy to the known or putative 
criminal.25 Outside these areas, life situations may blur the distinc-
tions between intrinsic privacy and socially derivative privacy, and 
the quite continuous blurring in judicial usage has made a reasoned 
evolution of a distinctive privacy concept quite difficult, if not im-
possible. For example, is associational privacy, which the NAACP 
has recently achieved but the Communist Party has not,20 an inde-
pendent right, protecting a basic secrecy-solitude interest? Or is it 
a derivative benefit, supporting freedom of political action and 
having no independent significance? If it is the latter, should not 
some term other than "associational privacy" be used, such as "free-
dom of secret association for public action"? 
A further problem in the prevalent loose characterizations of 
privacy as the "right to be let alone" is that the right tends to become 
indistinguishable from a policy of laissez-/ aire, promoting general 
freedom of action. One possibility for separating "privacy" from 
"freedom" as juristic concepts would be to focus on the idea of limits 
upon society's power either to make exposure or force disclosure of 
matters which the individual would prefer to keep secret. Thus 
narrowed, the term would be removed from the area of general 
laissez-faire interest, but the privacy concept might then be too 
narrow, because it would be revealed as centering really on an inter-
est in "secrecy," which is not a "warm" idea at all. Even though we 
have achieved the secret ballot in order to ensure an exact transla-
tion of private views into public choice, the "stand up and be 
counted" slogan still has wide appeal as indicative of a robust and 
25. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 
SUP, Cr. R.Ev. 46. 
26. Compare Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 872 U.S. 589 
(1963), with Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). While this article was in 
· galley the Supreme Court, on grounds of self-incrimination, set aside orders under 
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 compelling registration of Communist 
Party members, Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 86 Sup, Ct. 194 (1965), 
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fearless honesty. Secrecy commonly conveys a connotation of for-
bidden conspiracies, and conspiracies find few defenders.27 . 
Secrecy nevertheless may be an important component of the core 
idea of privacy as a public-law concept, and to this probably should 
be added the £actor of "solitude" -freedom from certain social 
impositions and pressures. The meaning of privacy, as thus refined 
and separated from a generalized concept of freedom~ may be fairly 
well encompassed by the twin ideas of secrecy, which protects th~ 
nondisclosure interest, and solitude, which protects against coercions 
of belief or, derivatively, against actions designed to make the hold-
ing of belief uncomfortable, or against any undue social intrusions 
on the intimacies and dignities of life. As already noted, however, 
these twin ideas are Janus-faced, because secrecy in the context of 
associational privacy is an activist concept supporting political ac-
tion, whereas solitude in the context of nondisclosure of nonconform-
ity is a passivist, right-to-be-let-alone concept. · 
When marital privacy is recognized, and then used to defend 
birth control clinics, an added dimension, which is neither secrecy 
nor solitude, seems to appear-a right of access to information rele-
vant to the specific condition of privacy at issue. To this we now turn. 
II. Griswold AND THE RIGHT TO PRIV4CY 
What does Griswold add to the judicial literature on the dimen-
sions of privacy in its constitutional .or public-law aspects? It does 
little, certainly, to clarify the conceptual dimensions of the privacy 
concept. But it does much to provide varied and flexible constitu~ 
tional ·underpinnings for those situations which do not fit established 
categories neatly but still seem to rest on values thought to be vital 
and which, for lack of a better term, are called privacy. In Griswold 
the Court avoided defining privacy narrowly and particularly, arid 
also avoided tying it to one or two supporting (but also necessarily 
limiting) clauses in the Constitution. By the very breadth and uncer-
tainty of the opinions, especially the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas 
for the Court-an opinion which roams through the Bill of Rights 
picking up a letter here and another there to spell out the · :riew 
27. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 577 (1951) Qackson, J., concur-
ring): "The law of conspiracy has been the chief means at the Government's disposal 
to deal with the growing problems created by such organizations. I happen to think 
it is an awkward and inept remedy, but I find no constitutional authority for taking 
this weapon from the Government. There is no constitutional right to 'gang up' on 
the Government." 
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right-the door was left open for continued probing and refinement 
of the privacy principle. 
A. The Penumbral Approach 
There is already a rich terrain to be investigated and a great need 
for closer analysis, as indicated by the varied content of the "zones 
of privacy,"28 and by the range of controversy over "penumbra! 
rights of 'privacy and repose,' "29 suggested by the cases cited by Mr. 
Justice Douglas, who mentioned more than a half dozen "privacy" 
situations. For example, the new derivative first amendment right 
of associational privacy was articulated in N AA GP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson30 as the "freedom to associate and privacy in one's associa-
tions." The right of religious belief was supported by West Virginia 
State Board of Educ. v. Barnette.31 The right to be undisturbed by 
the doorbell ringing of commercial solicitors was supported in 
Breard v. Alexandria.32 The right to be undisturbed by music and 
spoken advertisements while riding in public conveyances was denied 
by a sharply divided Court in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak.88 
The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure received 
added protection through the extension to the state courts of the 
exclusionary rule regarding illegally seized evidence in Mapp v. 
Ohio,34 and was further strengthened in Monroe v. Pape,8r, which 
dealt with the liability under the federal constitution of municipal 
police officers for illegal invasion and search of a home. The privacy 
of the jail cell was viewed dimly, but apparently not completely 
eradicated, in the recent dispute in Lanza v. New York86 over the 
use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping. The sanctity of the 
household, at least a household graced by a half-ton pile of trash and 
rodent feces, had to give way to permit rat-control inspection with-
out a warrant-but only by a 5-4 vote.87 Mr. Justice Douglas also 
alluded in Griswold to Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,88 
which invalidated Oklahoma's provision for compulsory sterilization 
of certain categories of habitual criminals, although his own opinion 
28. 381 U.S. at 484. 
29. Id. at 485. 
30. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
31. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
32. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
33. 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
34. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
35. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
36. 370 U.S. 139 (1962). 
37. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
38. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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for the Court in Skinner had stood not on the ground of intrinsic 
privacies in procreation, but rather on the denial of equal protection 
involved in the classification scheme used in the statute. 
The foregoing cases were simply listed by Mr. Justice Douglas 
and were not subjected to a fresh conceptual discussion; there was 
no attempt either to interrelate them or to use their particularity as 
a way of getting at a possible general central value of privacy. The 
list certainly reveals, however, a ri.ch potpourri of privacy matters, 
and more certainly could be added; Mr. Justice Douglas was only 
using illustrative examples with no intention of being exhaustive. 
B. The "Forgotten" Ninth Amendment 
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by the 
Chief Justice and Mr.Justice Brennan, rests on the ninth amend-
ment, and, indeed, constitutes the first major judicial treatment of 
the ninth amendment, which states: "The enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny o'r dis-
parage others retained by the people." 
Mr. Justice Goldberg's focus on the ninth amendment does not 
narrow the breadth and multiplicity of the zones of privacy sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Douglas. His special stress on the almost un-
fathomable ninth amendment strongly reaffirms the preexisting 
constitutional tradition of using substantive due process as a broad 
vehicle for judicial articulation and protection of "fundamental lib-
erties," whether or not they are specified elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion. And the ultimate effect may be to heighten the prospects for 
judicial support, case by case, for a broader range of "privacy" situa-
tions and of other hard-to-classify interests which, despite their 
vagueness, should be "retained by the people" in a democratic public 
order strongly committed to preserving individuality. 
There may very well be some past denials of privacy claims, such 
as those involved with the music and advertising programs in public 
conveyances that were at issue in Pollak, which might strike the 
Court differently if passed in review again under the ninth amend-
ment. Tactically, of course, use of the ninth amendment could be a 
basis for reaching a contrary result ·without the necessity of revers-
ing the earlier decisions. Mr. Justice Goldberg's approach, in short, 
does not offer assistance in defining privacy, but is at least congenial 
to further probing and experimentation. 
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C. Substantive Due Process and Privacy 
The separate concurrences of Mr. Justice Harlan and of Mr. 
Justice White, although related more to general principles of con-
stitutional interpretation and statutory analysis than to privacy per 
se, are not uncongenial to continued attempts to develop privacy as 
a more general constitutional principle than heretofore. Earlier, in 
the unsuccessful Poe v. Ullman89 challenge to the same Connecticut 
statute, Mr. Justice Harlan had made an exceptionally apt statement, 
which Mr. Justice Goldberg quoted approvingly in Griswold: 
· Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely 
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its pre-
eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life 
is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to 
its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted 
Constitutional right. . . . Of this whole "private realm of fam-
ily life" it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more 
intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations.40 
The main thrust of Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in 
Griswold was to oppose Mr. Justice Black's view that the fourteenth 
amendment is grounded in the Bill of Rights and impliedly limited 
thereby.41 Mr. Justice Harlan would preserve the fourteenth amend-
ment as a perpetually fresh basis for safeguarding basic values "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."42 
Mr. Justice White's opinion begins with an acceptance of the 
Harlan view of the fourteenth amendment and perhaps even en-
larges on it. He suggested that a statute with effects like that of the 
Connecticut statute "bears a substantial burden of justification when 
attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment,"48 and then proceeded 
to an analysis demonstrating that the Connecticut statute was not 
reasonably related, in its terms and operation, to the legitimate 
objective of barring extramarital affairs. · 
D. Negative View: Privacy and "Clear Meaning" 
Both Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart emerged as dis-
senters in Griswold, but not necessarily as "anti-privatarians." Mr. 
39. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
40. 381 U.S. at 495 (concurring opinion) (quoting _from Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
· 41. Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights1-
The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). 
42. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
43. 381 U.S. at 503 (concurring opinion). 
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Justice Black was the only Justice to stress sufficiently the· fact that 
" 'privacy' is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept."44 Privacy 
is broader than any one amendment because several of the specific 
guarantees are designed in part to protect something that might be 
called privacy, but each guarantee is also broader than privacy. 
For example, Mr. Justice Black correctly criticized the tendency 
to talk about the fourth amendment "as though it protects nothing 
but 'privacy.' "45 As he pointed out, a person may be _more annoyed 
by an unceremonious public arrest and consequent search by a po-
liceman than by a seizure in the privacy of his home. Similarly, there 
may be something instructive in the common over-use of the "pri-
vacy" label by persons writing about the fourth and fifth amend-
ments. 46 Although conceptual clarity is not advanced by the practice, 
the ·writer obtains a title which attracts more interest than would a 
"search and seizure" label, and which evokes an instinctively sym-
pathetic emotional response. This observation applies equally to 
the over-use of the privacy label by writers in the field of libel and 
slander, or on tort-law protections of other aspects of personality.47 
The main thrust of Mr. Justice Black's dissent, however, lies 
elsewhere. While he likes his privacy "as well as the next one,"48 he 
recognizes a right of the government to invade it, not when there is 
a counterbalancing governmental interest (heresy!), but whenever 
government is not "prohibited by some specific constitutional pro-
vision."49 The remainder of the disseQ.t develops further his theories 
of constitutional interpretation. It may come as a surprise to some 
to find that all Mr. Justice Black has been doing in !iis constitutional 
adjudication, at least in his own self-analysis, ~s to apply the "clear 
meaning" of the constitutional text.50 Be that as it may, his "clear 
44. Id. at 509 (dissenting opinion). 
45. Ibid. 
46. See, e.g., Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 
1962 SUP. CT. REv. 212. Compare King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional 
Rights, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 240 (1964), an essay with a modest title but with a 
sensitive perception of larger privacy issues and the need for a penumbra! approach 
in constitutional interpretation in this field. 
47. ERNST&: SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY-The RIGHT To BE LET ALONE (1962); HOFSTADTER 
&: HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1964); Blaustein, supra note 10. 
48. 381 U.S. at 510 (dissenting opinion). 
49. Ibid. . 
50. See MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER-CONFLICT IN THE°COURT 51-
60 (1961); Frantz, The First Amendment .in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); 
Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First 'Amendment-Absolutes in the Balance, 50 
CALIF. L. REv. 821 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor 
Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1963); Mendelson, The First Amendment and the 
Judicial Process-A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1964). See also.Black 
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meaning" yielded no protection for privacy in this instance. It may 
not be too clear to some students of constitutional law why, under 
Mr. Justice Black's "clear meaning" analysis, obscenity,li1 group 
libel,52 and associational privacy53 are constitutional absolutes along 
with simple free speech, while marital privacy, in the Griswold con-
text of access to birth control information, is no part of the due-
process liberty which the fourteenth amendment applies to the states. 
And is it just the "clear meaning" of the fourteenth amendment 
which requires a nationally uniform practice in regard to exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence,54 standards of self-incrimination and 
immunity statutes, 55 and the right to counsel?56 To pursue these 
questions, which are essentially questions of methods of constitu-
tional interpretation, would take us away from the subject of privacy 
and should be handled in a separate paper. 
Although Mr. Justice Black's "clear meaning" did not in this 
instance yield a privacy shield for Mrs. Griswold or contraceptives 
for her clients, there is always the possil:,ility that the "clear mean-
ing" of the Constitution may yield privacy protection in other fact 
situations. One aspect of "clear meaning" jurisprudence is its un-
predictability, in the guise of being best articulated.57 It can be 
& Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes"-A Public Interview, 37 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 549 (1962). 
51. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting). 
52. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
53. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 559 (1963} 
(Black, J., concurring). 
54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). 
55. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Mr. Justice Black voted with the majority. 
56. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
57. That "clear meaning" may not leave clear tracks and ensure predictability is 
indicated by the surprise some liberals felt in regard to Mr. Justice Black's recent 
support of state power in the 1964 sit-in decisions (see especially his dissenting opin-
ions in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 
U.S. 347, 363 (1964)), his dissent in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 575 (1965), from 
the Court's reversal of convictions for picketing near the courthouse, and his dissent 
in Griswold itself. In Cox he said: "Those who encourage minority groups to believe 
that the United States Constitution and federal laws give them a right to patrol and 
picket in the streets whenever they choose, in order to advance what they think to 
be a just and noble end, do no service to those minority groups, their cause, or their 
country." 379 U.S. at 584. If picketing is a form of free speech, Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88 (1940), this language, whether sound or unsound, is something less than 
first amendment absolutism. 
See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), where, with civil rights and civil 
liberties interests in conflict, Justices Douglas and Black in dissent would have barred 
the Civil Rights Commission from using confidential informants and from forbidding 
cross-examination in its hearings on alleged violations by the state of Louisiana of 
Negro rights. Was it only the "clear meaning" theory that kept Justices Douglas and 
Black in dissent, while the other half of the liberal block, the Chief Justice and Mr. 
Justice Brennan, split off and supported the Commission? 
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viewed as really a code jurisprudence rather than a common-law 
jurisprudence, although this may involve re-assessing Mr. Justice 
Black as a frustrated Napoleonic jurist. Perhaps its prime virtue is 
that it can lead to a quick "up-dating" of constitutional meaning 
without the need to worry much about the baggage of precedent. 
And its lack of "balancing" makes a "Brandeis brief" approach ir-
relevant. It lies, in short, at the opposite pole from that much-
maligned and usually totally misunderstood term, "neutral prin-
ciples."58 
E. Negative View: Is the Issue Privacy, or Access to Information? 
Although Justices Black and Stewart joined in each others' dis-
sents, the opinion ·written by Mr. Justice Stewart was quite unlike 
that written by Mr. Justice Black. It was Stewart who coined the 
phrase "uncommonly silly law,"59 a characterization of the statute 
which caught the fancy of the press and appeared in numerous edi-
torials. By "silly," he seems to have meant that the law was ·"ob-
viously unenforceable, except in the oblique context of the present 
case."60 
Although he did not pursue the point, this thought may have 
been an oblique attack by Mr. Justice Stewart on the issue of stand-
ing. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court was the only opinion 
to discuss the problem of standing, which had defeated earlier at-
tacks on the statute in the Tileston61 and Poe cases. In Griswold, of 
course, there had been an actual arrest of birth control clinic opera-
tors, whereas Tileston and Poe were only declaratory-judgment ac-
tions by physicians and patients in a setting of recent nonenforce-
ment of the statute. Despite these distinctions, the Court's very brief 
treatment of standing in Griswold is mystifying unless one realizes 
that the matter had been carefully canvassed in Poe just four years 
earlier, that the vote then was 5-4, and that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 
who had ·written the opinion for the Court in Poe, was no longer 
on the bench. 
" Nevertheless, there is still the question (and this also may have 
troubled Mr. Justice Stewart) of how the Griswold case became a 
58. See Stone, "Result-Orientation" and Appellate Judgment, in PERSPECTIVES OF 
LAW: EssAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTI 347 (1964), and the list of "neutral princi-
ples" articles' therein; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
59. 381 U.S. at 527 (dissenting opinion). 
60. Ibid. 
61. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
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right-of-marital-privacy case instead of a birth control clinic-regu-
latory policy case. It is instructive to remember Mr. Justice Bren• 
nan's statement in Poe that the true controversy was over the open-
ing of birth control clinics on a large scale. Because he felt that the 
issue was not presented properly, he concurred in the dismissal of the 
Poe case. Starting with this premise, it would seem that when the 
birth control clinic issue was raised squarely in Griswold by the ac-
tual arrest of clinic operators, the Court's discussion should have fo. 
cused to some extent on the question of the means and ends of state 
power to regulate birth control clinics. Instead, the dispensers of 
birth control advice were granted shelter under the marital privacy 
of users of contraceptives. 
To appreciate this aspect of the case it is important to recognize 
that "standing" in this sequence of birth control cases is at least a 
two-faceted issue. One facet is the actual threat of harm-the ques• 
tion of the prospect of enforcement on which Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Poe turned. An actual arrest solved this difficulty 
i~ Griswold. The other facet is the jus tertii issue-the standing of 
the defendant clinic operators to defend themselves by raising the 
rights of their clients to obtain birth control advice and to act on that 
advice by using the prescribed contraceptives. In according the de-
fendants standing to raise the constitutional rights of their married 
clients, Mr. Justice Douglas said simply: "The rights of husband 
. and wife, pressed here, are lik~ly to be diJuted or adversely affected 
unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have 
this kind of confidential relation to them."62 
Clearly, the "rights of husband and wife" which Mr. Justice 
Douglas had in mind did not consist merely of an interest in having 
the statute nullified so that the couple could use contraceptives with-
out fear of police invasion of their bedroom. The interest would 
have to be the broader one of an affirmative right of access to birth 
control information so that they could regulate, more safely and 
satisfactorily, the intimacies of their marital relationship. 
It was this broad apprc;>ach toward standing, allowing the defend-
ant clinic to raise the rights of married couples not before the Court, 
which brought the marital-privacy issue to the fore. This approach 
also submerged both the more· general question of state power to 
regulate birth control clinics, and Mr. Justice White's concern 
whether the means chosen were reasonably related to an assumed 
62. 381 U.S. at 481. 
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purpose of discouraging sexual promiscuity. The privacy issue thus 
raised is seen on close analysis not to be simply a right to be let 
alone; rather, it takes on the aspect of an affirmative right of access 
to information concerning a very private sphere of life. 
It may well be that Mr. Justice Stewart had an additional diffi-
culty with the majority's approach. His robust realism68 led him to 
reject the broad language in the majority opinions about preserving 
the inviolability of the marital chamber, because there was never 
any real prospect of statutory enforcement in that dfrection. Grant-
ing the clinic defendants standing to raise the issue of a right of 
marital privacy in the use of contraceptives, and handling the case 
primarily on this basis, does not help their cause from the Stewart 
perspective; it hurts their cause because it directs attention to 
an unreal situation and blunts the real issue, which is access to 
information-and freedom to dispense information-about marital 
privacies. 
Since information relevant to marital privacies is what Griswold, 
functionally viewed, comes down to, it is a pity that the majority 
and the dissents did not join issue on what might be characterized 
as a dissemination-of-information and making-privacy-effective type 
of issue, supported by the first amendment. Both Justices Black and 
Stewart noted this approach, but brushed it aside, albeit not very 
convincingly. The approach involves an· analysis of the standing 
and substantive rights of dispensers of birth control information, as 
well as the standing and substantive rights of recipients of birth con-
trol information. 
III. EFFECTUATING MARITAL PRIVACY: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO 
BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION 
Merely to phrase the above caption may be to suggest the kind 
of conceptual confusion which seems to be inherent in the privacy 
63. See, e.g., his opinions in the reapportionment decisions, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 588 (1964), and companion cases in 377 U.S. at 676, 693, 712, and especially 
744. Although in the opinion of the present writer (Reapportionment in the Supreme 
Court and Congress-Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 
209 (1964)), no Justice covered himself with glory in the opinions written in the re-
apportionment decisions, as distinguished from the results, Mr. Justice Stewart came 
closer than any other to hitting the mark and realizing that the battle concerned rep-
resentation and not mathematical abstractions about equal masses of census statistics. 
Also indicative of his realistic approach was his desire for more facts on the actual 
impact on the child of prayer and Bible-reading practices- in public schools before 
reaching and resolving the constitutional issues. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 319-20 (1963) (dissenting opinion). 
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field. If privacy is essentially a state of peace and repose which we 
seek to protect from invasion, does it not take some mental gymnas-
tics to say that derived from this premise of privacy, or associated 
with it as part of the core concept, there is a right of access to in-
formation relevant to rational use and enjoyment of the state of 
privacy? But are not both elements unavoidably present in the 
Griswold case, and does not the approach of the Court gloss over the 
conceptual difficulties? Without the birth control clinic operation, 
there would have been no case. The only interest of a married couple 
vis-a-vis the clinic is an interest in obtaining information relevant 
to a very private part of their lives. By invoking the married couples' 
fictional fear of prosecution for use of contraceptives to give the 
clinic defendants standing to defend themselves from actual prosecu-
tion for giving advice, the Court tied marital privacy and access to 
information together into a single bundle of rights. The Court's 
approach to standing also in effect reconstituted the facts and issues 
at the appellate level. Had the reconstituted facts been the actual 
facts, the decision probably would have been unanimous. To talk of 
allowing "the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives"64 is obviously 
"repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage rela-
tionship."65 
But what about the actual case of clinic operation, and the actual 
question of the allowable range of that operation? What about the 
BlaGk-Stewart distinction between mere advice and the actual dis-
semination of contrac-eptives as part of a "planned course of con-
duct"? If only advice had been involved, Justices Black and Stewart 
apparently would have joined the majority on free-speech grounds, 
but with no conscious overlay of marital privacy. 
In effect, therefore, the Court used standing as a ploy to avoid 
discussing these questions, which shape the real issue in the case, and 
which the caption at the beginning of this section seeks to articulate. 
The result reached by the Court is clear. The clinic can continue to 
operate, and married couples, at least, have access to birth control 
information by resort to the clinic. If this decision rests on the 
peculiar wording of the Connecticut statute, which proscribed "use," 
then the decision is very narrow. Repeal of the "use" statute and 
substitution of a statute regulating or proscribing clinic operation 
64. 381 U.S. at 485. 
65. Id. at 486. 
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per se would present a fresh situation.66 But if the Court's stress on 
"marital privacy" in the use of contraceptives extends to a right of 
access to birth control information, then the case yields a broad 
precedent indeed. In rationalizing it, scholars might dispute whether 
the precedent can be derived from the first amendment alone, or 
whether the "penumbra!" right of privacy is a necessary adjunct. 
A perusal of the briefs67 :filed in the Supreme Court in 
Griswold indicates that the attorneys conceived the essence of the 
appeal to be either a due-process test of whether the Connecticut law 
was a reasonable means to achieve · a proper legislative purpose, or 
a first amendment test of whether the statute violated any free-
speech rights of the acting director of the clinic, Mrs. Griswold, and 
the medical director, Dr. Buxton. Privacy was handled only in the 
fictional context of bedroom invasion, with citations to Rochin v. 
California.68 There was no clear attempt either to extend the asser-
tion of freedom of speech to include the right of clinic patients to 
obtain birth control information, or to extend the assertion of the 
right of marital privacy to include a right of access to information 
intimately related to, and supportive of, conjugal privacy. 
Free speech, discussed alone and unrelated to privacy, was 
phrased variously in the briefs as a right to intellectual freedom, 69 
freedom of expression, 70 a right to disseminate information,71 a right 
to practice medicine in accord with accepted scientific principles72 
(better phrased perhaps as a right to speak the truth), a right of 
physicians to advise patients,73 and a physician's freedom of profes-
sional conscience.74 For Justices Black and Stewart, all of this con-
66. It is doubtful, however, that the outcome would be different. The following 
comment of Mr. Justice White, the only Justice to discuss the actual question of clinic 
operation, is directly in point: "[I']he clear effect of these statutes, as enforced, is to 
deny disadvantaged citizens of Connecticut, those without either adequate knowledge 
or resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical assistance and up-to-date 
information in respect to proper methods of birth control •.•. In my view, a statute 
with these effects bears a substantial burden of justification when attacked under the 
Fourteenth Amendment." 381 U.S. at 503 (concurring opinion). 
67. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants; Motion To Dismiss Appeal for Ap-
pellee; Brief for Appellants; Brief for Appellee; Brief for Catholic Council on Civil 
Liberties as Amicus Curiae; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union as · Amici Curiae; Brief for. Physicians as Amici 
Curiae. 
68. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
69. Brief for Appellant, p. 17. 
70. Id. at 20. 
71. Id. at 23. 
72. Id. at 67. 
73. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants, p. 6. 
74. Brief for Physicians as Amici Curiae. 
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certed effort focused on a basic free speech-first amendment claim 
went down the drain because, as the state had asserted, the "speech" 
was too intermixed with a sequence of "action," consisting of physical 
examinations, prescriptions, and in some cases the dispensing of birth 
control devices, with a graduated scale of fees for those who could 
pay.75 Regarding the merits of the free speech issue per se, one may 
note that the "speech"-"action" dichotomy is easier to state than to 
apply neatly and consistently, and may contrast Mr. Justice Black 
in Griswold with Mr. Justice Black in Dennis v. United States.70 
Although Mr. Justice Black objected to the "planned course of con-
duct" in Griswold, it was just this concept that led the majority in 
Dennis to affirm the convictions over Mr. Justice Black's dissent. 
More relevant to the present discussion, however, is this question: 
What would have been the effect of an attempted link-up between 
a claim of marital privacy, defined· to include a need for information 
of the birth control type, and a first amendment claim defined to 
include a right against state denial of access to information which is 
available and needed for intelligent decision? Such a combination 
would not only have closed a logical gap in the case, but would also 
have made it more difficult for Justices Black and Stewart to brush 
aside the free-speech claim simply on the ground that "action" was 
involved. With such a combination, the "action" at issue, which for 
Justices Black and Stewart qualified out of existence the first amend-
ment claim of the clinic staff, would appear in a new light as some-
thing supportive of the first amendment-information claim of those 
who turned to the clinic for help. There would still be a planned 
course of conduct, but it would be responsive to a first amendment-
privacy claim of married couples, and the fact the aid went beyond 
advice to include the objects described in the advice would seem to 
be incidental. When it is sometimes said that speech is an end in it-
self, what is really denoted is a feeling of the primacy of free speech 
as a constitutional value, not that it is a passive entity in an action-
less vacuum. 
75. After noting that the clinic activity included supplying contraceptive devices, 
Mr. Justice Black said: "Thus these defendants admittedly engaged with others in a 
planned course of conduct to help people violate the Connecticut law. • , , What 
would be the constitutional fate of the law if hereafter applied to punish nothing but 
speech is, as I have said, quite another matter." 381 U.S. at 508 (dissenting opinion), 
Similarly, Mr. Justice Stewart said: "If all the appellants had done was to advise peo• 
pie that they thought the use of contraceptives was desirable, or even to counsel their 
use, the appellants would, of course, have a substantial First Amendment claim. But 
their activities went far beyond mere advocacy." Id. at 529 n.2 (dissenting opinion), 
76. 341 U.S. ~94, 579 (1951) (dissenting opinion). 
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In other words, is not the first amendment claim weak when 
looked at only from the viewpoint of the dispensing of information, 
because of the additional "action" factors on the part of the clinic, 
and far stronger when looked at from the viewpoint of the recipient, 
especially when it is intermixed with a "making privacy effective" 
argument? Viewed thus, a finding of "action" should not end the 
first amendment discussion, but should instead invite further in-
quiry as to purposes and effects. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Elaboration of this suggested theory of an affirmative right of 
access to birth control information must await further litigation. 
It might be founded jointly on the first amendment and on the new 
constitutionally recognized "penumbra!" right of marital privacy. 
Additional support might be forthcoming from the once forgotten 
but now remembered ninth amendment. If birth control informa-
tion is available but for the intervening hand of the state, can that 
hand perhaps be brushed aside by articulating a constitutionally 
protected ninth amendment ·"other right" of private self-help and 
self-control regarding an intimate sphere of private life? Could the 
formula be generalized beyond birth control to other areas, or is 
birth control sui generis? 
Approached from a slightly different standpoint, is not the ninth 
amendment concept of rights retained by the people well adapted 
to support a constitutional policy of confining the privacy invasions 
authorized by other constitutional processes to the bare minimum 
necessary to accomplish valid social ends?77 
Suffice it to say for the present that unless some kind of informa-
tion-access theory is recognized as implicit in Griswold, then it stands 
as a decision without a satisfying rationale. At least it will· stand 
thus except for those who can JOin the Court in using the ploy of 
77. There may be some unarticulated privacy aspects in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
532 (1965), decided the same day as Griswold, in which a conviction was Teversed 
because the trial had been televised. Except for a pa!:Sing mention in the Brief of the 
Petitioner, pp. 16-18, and Mr. Justice Clark's statement in his opinion for the Court 
that televised trial coverage "is a form of mental-if not physical-harassment" of the 
defendant (381 U.S. at 549), the primary focus in the briefs and opinions was on de-
nial of a fair trial because of the impact of television. See also Brief of American 
Civil Liberties Union and the Texas Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae; Brief of the 
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae. And yet could it not be argued, consistently 
with the result in Estes, that even though a trial is not a secret place, there is a 
ninth amendment "other right" of a defendant not to have his public courtroom trial 
transformed into a public television spectacle? 
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"standing" to re-make the actual birth-control-clinic situation into 
a marital-use-of-contraceptives situation. With the issue thus re-
made, we have a modern morality play, with much judicial finger-
shaking at fictional police invading a fictional bedchamber of a 
fictional couple in search of evidence of the use of contraceptives. 
The actual result of Griswold may be applauded, but to reach this 
result was it necessary to play charades with the Constitution? 
